Wood v Prudential Ins Co by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-28-2000 
Wood v Prudential Ins Co 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Wood v Prudential Ins Co" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 69. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/69 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed March 28, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-5022 
 
JAMES W. WOOD 
 
v. 
 
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 
 
(D.C. Civil No. 98-cv-02383) 
 
JAMES W. WOOD; KAREN WOOD, individually and as 
Guardians of MATTHEW WOOD, incompetent 
 
v. 
 
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 
 
(D.C. Civil No. 98-cv-02487) 
 
James Wood; Karen Wood, individually and as guardians 
of Matthew Wood, incompetent 
 
       Appellants 
 
On appeal from Orders entered in the 
United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 98-2383 and 
98-2487) (Consolidated Cases) 
Chief District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
 
Argued: November 16, 1999 
 
 
 
 
Before: ALITO AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and 
FEIKENS, District Judge. 
 
(Filed: March 28, 2000) 
 
       G. Martin Meyers (argued) 
       Law Offices of G. Martin Meyers, 
       P.C. 
       35 West Main Street 
       Suite 106 
       Denville, New Jersey 07834 
       Attorney for Appellants 
 
       Don A. Innamorato 
       Stephanie Wilson 
       Reed Smith Shaw & McClay LLP 
       136 Main Street, Suite 250 
       Princeton, New Jersey 08543-7839 
        and 
       David Bennet Ross 
       Peter A. Walker (argued) 
       Mara-Louise Anzalone 
       Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & 
       Geraldson 
       1270 Avenue of the Americas 
       Suite 2500 
       New York, New York 10020-1801 
       Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FEIKENS, District Judge: 
 
I. Background 
 
In 1998, Appellant James Wood ("Wood") filed suit in a 
New Jersey state court against his former employer, The 
Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential"). In 
his complaint, Wood pleaded four counts against 
Prudential: discrimination based on a New Jersey statute1; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. 
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defamation; outrage; and discrimination based on the New 
Jersey constitution2. Wood alleged that Prudential 
discriminated against him by terminating his employment 
to avoid paying benefits3 to him and his dependents. In this 
state suit, Wood sought, inter alia, compensatory damages, 
damages for humiliation, pain and suffering, and punitive 
damages. Prudential removed the suit to the U.S. District 
Court of New Jersey asserting that the Employee 
Retirement Insurance Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C. S 1001 et seq., completely preempted both Wood's 
claim of discrimination under the state statute and his 
claim of discrimination under the state constitution. In 
denying Wood's motion to remand the suit to state court, 
the United States District Court held that ERISA completely 
preempted those two claims. The court took supplemental 
jurisdiction over the claims of defamation and outrage and 
construed the claim of outrage as a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
 
Wood and his wife, Karen Wood, individually and on 
behalf of their son, Matthew Wood, then filed suit later in 
1998 in the U.S. District Court of New Jersey alleging that 
Prudential's termination of Wood's employment violated 
ERISA and, since Matthew Wood was disabled, that it 
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). For his 
ERISA claim, Wood sought equitable relief and, for his ADA 
claim, Wood sought compensatory and other damages. The 
District Court dismissed the ADA claim, consolidated the 
two cases, and granted Prudential's motion to submit all 
claims to arbitration. 
 
II. Issues 
 
Several questions are presented to us on appeal: 
 
       1) Is complete preemption of a state claim that is 
       subject to Section 510 of ERISA warranted even if the 
       state claim prays for relief arguably not provided for in 
       Section 502(a) of ERISA? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. New Jersey Constitution of 1947, Art. 1, P 1. 
 
3. The parties define these benefits as health and retirement benefits. 
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       2) Assuming that complete preemption applies, may 
       the District Court compel arbitration of his claims 
       under the facts of this case? 
 
       3) In order to rule on these questions, did the District 
       Court, and do we, have jurisdiction? 
 
III. Complete Preemption 
 
A. 
 
The District Court denied Wood's motion to remand 
holding that ERISA completely preempted Wood's claim of 
discrimination based on the state statute. The District 
Court read that claim as an assertion "that depriving him 
of his retirement benefits was the motivating purpose for, 
and not merely a consequence of, his termination." We 
agree with this reading.4 
 
In his state complaint, Woods alleges generally that: 
 
       [T]he real reason that . . . Prudential terminated [his] 
       employment . . . was its knowledge that, because he 
       was fifty-one years old, and had more than twenty 
       years of service with Prudential, plaintiff Jim Wood was 
       about to become eligible for full retirement benefits. 
       Defendant Prudential knew that the vesting of those 
       benefits would require it to continue to be responsible 
       for the medical expenses of the plaintiff and of his 
       dependents, including the plaintiff's son, Matthew 
       Wood. 
 
State Complaint P4, A-16. He repeats this general allegation 
in each of his four state law claims. State Complaint PP 7, 
10, 13, 16, A-19-21. Since Wood's son suffers from severe 
head injuries due to a car accident, Wood alleges that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court held that ERISA also completely preempted Wood's 
claim of discrimination based on the state constitution because that 
claim was substantially identical to the claim of discrimination based on 
the state statute. Both holdings are subject to appeal, but Wood has not 
challenged the District Court's holding as to the complete preemption of 
the claim of discrimination based on the state constitution. Thus, we do 
not address this holding. 
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medical bills for his son run into the "millions of dollars." 
State Complaint P 5, A-17. 
 
Wood argues that his complaint contains claims of age 
and disability discrimination entirely separate from this 
benefits-defeating allegation. But, we find nothing in his 
complaint other than an allegation that Prudential 
terminated Wood's employment to avoid paying health and 
retirement benefits. 
 
Wood argues that his complaint alleges discrimination 
based on age because it referred directly to his age. The 
relevant portion of the allegation reads: "[B]ecause he was 
fifty-one years old, and had more than twenty years of 
service with Prudential, plaintiff Jim Wood was about to 
become eligible for full retirement benefits." State 
Complaint P 4, A-16. It seems obvious that Wood's 
reference to age, like the accompanying reference to his 
length of service, establishes the allegation that Wood was 
"about to become eligible for full retirement benefits." His 
age is relevant only insofar as it affected his eligibility for 
benefits. We agree with the District Court when it noted: 
"Aside from nearing early retirement age, there are no facts 
alleged in the Complaint to support a claim that Wood's age 
had any bearing on Prudential's decision to terminate him." 
 
Wood also argues that his state court complaint alleges 
discrimination based on the disability of Wood's son. His 
complaint mentions the disability of his son only in the 
context of Prudential's potential obligation for the high 
medical expenses of his son. Since Wood's state 
discrimination claim provides no rationale for Prudential's 
treatment other than to avoid paying benefits to him and to 
his dependents, we read the complaint as alleging that 
Prudential's termination of Wood's employment had a 
benefits-defeating motive. 
 
B. 
 
A claim of discharge based on a "benefits-defeating" 
motive comes under Section 510 of ERISA. That section 
prohibits the "discharge of a participant or beneficiary for 
the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right 
to which such participant may become entitled."S 510, 29 
 
                                5 
 
 
U.S.C. S 1140. "Congress enacted this section to prevent 
unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing 
their employees in order to prevent them from obtaining 
their statutory or plan-based rights." Zipf v. American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 799 F.2d 889, 891 (3rd Cir. 
1986); see, also, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 
133, 143 (1990). 
 
Section 510 of ERISA does not stand alone; by its terms 
it gains its enforcement vitality from Section 502. Section 
510 provides: "The provisions of [section 502] of this title 
shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section." 
S 510, 29 U.S.C. S 1140. Thus, any state claim that falls 
within Section 510 is necessarily within Section 502. 
 
C. 
 
Federal courts have jurisdiction over claims "arising 
under the Constitution, law or treaties of the United 
States." 28 U.S.C. S 1331. Under the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, a court determines whether a claim"arises 
under" federal law from a plaintiff's complaint. Metropolitan 
Life v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1987) ("It is long-settled law 
that a cause of action arises under federal law only when 
the plaintiff's well pleaded complaint raises issues of federal 
law."). A plaintiff is, thus, considered the"master of the 
complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398- 
99 (1987). 
 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
doctrine of complete preemption as a corollary or an 
exception to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Metropolitan 
Life, 481 U.S. at 63-64. Under this complete preemption 
exception, the Court has held that "Congress may so 
completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil 
complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily 
federal in character." Id. Since ERISA Section 502(a) 
completely preempts a state claim, removal of Wood's state 
claim to federal jurisdiction is proper. See id.  at 66 
("Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes 
of action within the scope of 502(a) removable to federal 
court."); Joyce v. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. , 126 F.3d 
166, 172 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
 
                                6 
 
 
We reject Wood's contention that, because none of the 
relief he requested in his state claim is available under 
Section 502, ERISA does not completely preempt his state 
action. The relief Wood seeks is irrelevant to a 
determination of complete preemption. Complete 
 
preemption, like ordinary preemption, does not depend on 
the type of relief requested in a complaint. Complete 
preemption is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint 
rule. "[T]he pre-emptive effect of S 502(a) [is] so complete 
that an ERISA pre-emption defense provides a sufficient 
basis for removal of a cause of action to the federal forum 
notwithstanding the traditional limitations imposed by the 
"well-pleaded complaint" rule." Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 
145 (citing Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64-67). 
 
Additionally, a state law claim may fall within Section 
502(a) and thus be completely preempted even if the 
plaintiff asks for relief that is not available under Section 
502(a). In Metropolitan Life, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, 
compensatory damages for mental anguish caused by a 
denial of benefits. 481 U.S. at 61. Even though such relief 
is not available under S 502(a), the Court held that ERISA 
completely preempted his claim and, thus, removal was 
proper. Id. at 67. While the Court considered only Section 
501(a)(1)(B), the Court's language applies broadly to all of 
Section 502(a). See id. at 66 ("Congress has clearly 
manifested an attempt to make causes of action within the 
scope of the civil enforcement provisions of S 502(a) 
removable to federal court.") 
 
Similarly, in Ingersoll-Rand, the Court discussed the 
interaction of Sections 510 and 502(a) in the context of a 
plaintiff's requested relief. See 498 U.S. at 145. It wrote: 
 
       Not only is S 502(a) the exclusive remedy for vindicating 
       S 510-protected rights, but there is no basis in 
       S 502(a)'s language for limiting ERISA actions only to 
       those which seek "pension benefits." . . . Consequently, 
       it is no answer to a pre-emption argument that a 
       particular plaintiff is not seeking recovery of pension 
       benefits. 
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Id.5 
 
In explaining complete preemption in Ingersoll-Rand, the 
Court applied the rationale of ordinary preemption to 
complete preemption: 
 
       "The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain 
       remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal 
       scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan 
       participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain 
       remedies under state law that Congress rejected in 
       ERISA. The six carefully integrated civil enforcement 
       provisions found in S 502(a) of the statute asfinally 
       enacted . . . provide strong evidence that Congress did 
       not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply 
       forgot to incorporate expressly." 
 
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 144 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted)). Were we to hold that Wood's 
claim is not preempted because he sought remedies not 
provided for in Section 502(a), we would undermine 
Congress' policy choices as reflected in the remedies it set 
forth in Section 502(a). Given that "Congress viewed 
[Section 510] as a crucial part of ERISA" Ingersoll-Rand Co., 
498 U.S. at 143, we are mindful of these policy choices. 
Cf. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction La borers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1983) (finding state cause of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. While this quoted portion of the opinion in Ingersoll-Rand may be 
dicta, it is still sound analysis. The dissent argues that we should not 
give Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. 133, any weight because the statements on 
which we rely are dicta. According to the dissent, when the Court stated, 
"when it is clear or may fairly be assumed  that the activities which a 
state purports to regulate are protected by S 510 of ERISA, due regard 
for the federal enactment requires the state jurisdiction to yield," id. 
at 
 
145 (emphasis added), this is not a significant statement. We disagree. 
The Court, even though it did not have to make that statement in the 
Ingersoll-Rand case, did so, it seems, because it wanted to point out that 
S 510 does not stand alone and that S 502(a) and S 510 must be read 
together. It is because of this interaction -- an interaction found in the 
plain words of S 510, see 29 U.S.C.S 1140 -- that we find that Wood's 
claim is completely preempted. The dissent is reluctant to recognize that 
interaction. 
 
                                8 
 
 
action not completely preempted where "State's right to 
enforce its tax levies is not of central concern to" ERISA). 
 
We note that Wood, while seeking money damages for his 
allegedly improper termination in his state claim, see State 
Complaint, A-19, seeks equitable damages for the same 
termination in his federal ERISA claim. See Federal 
Complaint, A-103. Allowing such parallel claims to be tried 
in both state and federal courts would undermine Congress' 
choice of remedies as reflected in Section 502(a). See, e.g., 
Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins., 139 F.3d 1346, 1354, 
n.11. (11th Cir. 1998) ("Although an ERISA beneficiary 
cannot obtain punitive damages in an action for benefits, 
the prayer for punitive damages does not take [plaintiff's] 
claim out of the scope of [Section 502(a)]. If it did, any 
plaintiff could thwart Congress's intent to completely 
preempt claims arising out of the denial of ERISA benefits 
by artful pleading.") Complete preemption would be an 
empty doctrine if a plaintiff could plead his way into state 
court by seeking only money damages. See, e.g., Rice v. 
Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[I]f a claim is 
within S 502(a) then a participant's ability to recover 
damages is limited.") 
 
For these reasons, we find that ERISA preempted Wood's 
state claim of discrimination, that we have jurisdiction, 
and, thus, we affirm the District Court's denial of remand. 
 
IV. Arbitration 
 
Before turning to the issue whether Wood's claims are 
arbitrable, we must consider our jurisdiction over the 
arbitration issue. We reject Prudential's contention that we 
do not have jurisdiction to consider the decision to compel 
arbitration. 
 
We have held that where a district court's dismissal of an 
action signifies that the arbitration is "not a part of any 
ongoing proceeding," the court of appeals has jurisdiction 
from a final order. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Columbus, Ohio v. 
Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 46 (3rd Cir. 1991). In Nationwide, 
we reviewed a district court's decision to dismiss a case on 
the grounds that the parties were obliged to arbitrate. 
There, we stated: "[A]lthough the result of the district 
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court's order is that the parties will arbitrate their dispute, 
the district court's dismissal of [the] action plainly signifies 
that this is not a part of any ongoing proceeding. Therefore, 
we hold that we have appellate jurisdiction." Id. In 
Nationwide, we held the matter a reviewablefinal order in 
spite of "the practical effect of the district court's order 
. . . that the parties will now submit their dispute to 
arbitration." Id. at 45. 
 
To distinguish Nationwide, Prudential seeks to make the 
point that the District Court in this case faced a motion to 
compel arbitration while the District Court in Nationwide 
granted a motion to dismiss and made no order to 
arbitrate. No matter how the motion is drawn, the District 
Courts' conclusions were the same: both in Nationwide and 
in this case, the District Court appropriately dismissed the 
action upon motion. 
 
We next consider the District Court's decision to compel 
arbitration. Our review is plenary. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, 
Robinson & Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912, 925 (3rd Cir. 1992). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that: 
 
       [A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the 
       scope of arbitration should be resolved in favor of 
       arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
       construction of the contract language itself or an 
       allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
       arbitrability. 
 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (emphasis added). In order to 
obtain a finding that arbitration is waived, a party seeking 
to avoid arbitration must demonstrate prejudice. See 
Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 925 ("prejudice is the touchstone for 
determining whether the right to arbitrate has been 
waived."). 
 
Wood argues that Prudential waived its right to arbitrate 
because, in a joint discovery plan filed June 12, 1988, 
Prudential "reserve[d] the right to file a motion to compel 
arbitration on or before August 1, 1998," and, then, did not 
act on that intention until September 24, 1998, when it 
filed its motion to compel arbitration. 
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We hold that Prudential did not waive its right to 
arbitrate; the delay was short and Prudential did not 
engage in significant litigation action that could have 
caused prejudice to Wood. It delayed seeking arbitration 
only by one-and-a-half months. Cf. Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 
926 (finding waiver where delay was eleven months). 
Prudential's litigation tactics had not been extensive: it had 
not taken any depositions nor served any discovery 
demands. Prudential does not appear to have been"able to 
use the Federal Rules to conduct discovery not available in 
the arbitration forum." Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 926. While 
Prudential contested the merits of the claims in District 
Court, this is not enough to overcome the presumption of 
arbitrability. See Moses H. Cohn, 460 U.S. at 24-25. 
 
To establish prejudice, Wood argues that Prudential's 
delay put him at a strategic disadvantage. He states that 
his "counsel made key litigation decisions based upon his 
belief that Prudential had abandoned its initial intention to 
seek arbitration of this controversy," specifically that 
"counsel would have asked the District Court to withhold 
any ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss. . .." The 
District Court considered that motion and dismissed the 
Americans with Disability Act claim but not the ERISA 
claim. Putting aside whether the District Court would have 
agreed to a request to withhold such a ruling, we do not 
understand how Wood could be prejudiced by the Court's 
having decided the matter. For this decision to be 
prejudicial, we would have to presume that an arbitrator 
would have decided the merits of the claim differently -- a 
presumption we cannot make. 
 
Wood argues that the arbitration agreement does not 
apply to his claims of defamation and of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress because they both arose 
after the termination of his employment. The arbitration 
agreement applicable to this case is contained in a National 
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") Uniform 
Application for Securities Industry Registration ("U-4 Form") 
and calls for arbitration of any dispute, claim or 
controversy between Wood and Prudential "to be arbitrated 
under the rules . . . or by-laws of [the NASD]." A-246. It 
requires arbitration under the NASD Code of any claim 
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"arising out of the employment or termination of 
employment of such associated person(s) with such 
 
member. . . ." A-254, NASD Manual (CCH) S10201. 
 
Wood's claim of defamation is based on Prudential's 
forwarding of Wood's termination letter to the New Jersey 
Department of Insurance. State Complaint PP 6, 11, A-17, 
19. In that letter, Prudential referenced Wood's alleged 
violations of company rules. A-23. Since the alleged 
defamation was a description of Wood's activities while 
employed at Prudential and was contained in Wood's 
termination letter, we hold that the claim of defamation 
arose out of his employment and its termination. Thus, 
Wood's defamation claim is arbitrable. 
 
Wood's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
also arises out of Wood's employment and its termination. 
He alleges that Prudential's actions "were outrageous, by 
reason of [its] use of false and defamatory allegations of 
wrongdoing as a pretext for the termination of the plaintiff. 
. . ." State Complaint P 14, A-20. Again, the claim centers 
on Wood's termination and is, thus, covered by the 
arbitration agreement. 
 
Wood also contends that the arbitration agreement does 
not apply to his state law discrimination claim because of 
an amendment to the NASD rules. We disagree. The 
amendment, effective January 1, 1999, exempts from 
mandatory arbitration "claim[s] alleging employment 
discrimination . . . in violation of a statute." Rule 10201(b) 
of NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, A-525. Because the 
amendment was not effective until January 1, 1999, it did 
not affect the arbitration agreement between these two 
parties which requires Wood to comply with arbitration as 
defined by the NASD Code at the time he filed suit in 1998. 
See Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 187 
(3rd Cir. 1998) ("[The] Form U-4 compliance clause 
obligates a registrant to comply with the NASD arbitration 
code as it existed at the time she filed suit."). 
 
We hold, thus, that the arbitration agreement applies to 
Wood's state law claims of discrimination, defamation, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Wood does not 
dispute that the arbitration agreement applies to his other 
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claims. Thus, we affirm the District Court's ruling to 
compel arbitration over all the claims in these consolidated 
cases. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
We affirm the District Court's decision to deny remand of 
Wood's state suit. We also affirm the District Court's 
decision to compel arbitration as to all claims in the 
consolidated suits. 
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Stapleton, J., dissenting: 
 
Because I conclude that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I. 
 
Generally, "the `well-pleaded complaint rule' requires 
that, for removal to be appropriate, a federal question must 
appear on the face of the complaint." Joyce v. RJR Nabisco 
Holdings Corp., 126 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1997). "Under a 
narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, 
however, Congress may `completely preempt' a particular 
area of law such that any claim that falls within this area 
is `necessarily federal in character.' " Id. "Complete 
preemption" must be distinguished from "ordinary 
preemption." Complete preemption is a jurisdictional 
doctrine, whereas ordinary preemption is merely a federal 
defense that does not create removal jurisdiction. See id. 
 
Absent diversity or some other independent basis for 
federal jurisdiction, a federal court has no jurisdiction to 
entertain a complaint removed from a state court that relies 
on state law ordinarily preempted by ERISA. Cf. Caterpillar 
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398 (1987) ("The fact that a 
defendant might ultimately prove that a plaintiff's claims 
are pre-empted under the NLRA does not establish that 
they are removable to federal court."); Goepel v. National 
Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 316 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(" `State courts are competent to determine whether state 
law has been preempted by federal law,' and, absent 
complete preemption, `they must be permitted to perform 
that function' with regard to state law claims brought 
before them."). As a result, such a complaint, if removed, 
must be returned to state court. The defendant's remedy is 
to seek dismissal or summary judgment in the state court 
on the grounds of preemption. 
 
If a claim based on state law is completely preempted, 
however, it is treated as a federal claim; a district court has 
federal question removal jurisdiction to entertain it, and the 
claim, after removal, should go forward in the district court 
as a federal claim. See International Brotherhood of Elec. 
Workers, 481 U.S. 851, 862-63 (1987) (afterfinding 
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complete preemption, considering the merits of plaintiff's 
suit "treated as a S 301 claim"); Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 
1111, 1114-15 (3d Cir. 1997) (after determining that it had 
complete preemption removal jurisdiction, district court 
adjudicated claim on the merits); see also Pilot Life Ins. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (complete preemption 
results from Congress' intent that suits "be treated as 
federal questions governed by S 502(a)"); Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure  S 3722.1, at 
511 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining that complete preemption 
substitutes a federal cause of action for the preempted 
state cause of action). 
 
Section 514(a) of ERISA broadly preempts "any and all 
State laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit 
plan," but this is ordinary preemption only, and does not 
create federal removal jurisdiction. Joyce, 126 F.3d at 171 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. S 1144(a)). "Only state claims that come 
within ERISA's civil enforcement provisions in S 502(a) are 
completely preempted such that removal to federal court is 
appropriate." Id. State causes of action for wrongful 
discharge motivated by the desire to prevent a pension from 
vesting fall squarely within the ambit of S 510 and are 
ordinarily preempted by ERISA. See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 
U.S. at 140, 142-45. Ordinary preemption under ERISA, 
without more, however, does not convert a state claim into 
one that is necessarily federal for jurisdictional purposes. 
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 
(1987). 
 
In Metropolitan Life, the Court did find that the civil 
enforcement provision in S 502(a)(1)(B) has complete 
preemptive power, but in doing so, it stated that: 
 
       [e]ven with a provision such as S 502(a)(1)(B) that lies 
       at the heart of a statute with the unique preemptive 
       force of ERISA, however, we would be reluctant tofind 
       that extraordinary preemptive power, such as has been 
       found with respect to S 301 of the LMRA, that converts 
       an ordinary state common law complaint into one 
       stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded 
       complaint rule. 
 
Id. at 65. The Court based its finding of complete 
preemption on strong evidence of Congressional intent, not 
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merely to preempt state law, but to invoke the jurisdictional 
doctrine of complete preemption. In particular, the Court 
relied on the fact that "the language of the jurisdictional 
subsection of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions closely 
parallels that of S 301 of the LMRA," which the Court had 
already interpreted as giving rise to complete preemption at 
the time that ERISA was drafted. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(f) and 29 U.S.C. S 185(a)). The Court also noted 
legislative history stating that: 
 
       [w]ith respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under 
       the plan or to recover benefits under the plan . .. they 
       may be brought not only in U.S. district courts but also 
       in state courts of competent jurisdiction. All such 
       actions . . . are to be regarded as arising under the 
       laws of the United States in similar fashion to those 
       brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management 
       Relations Act of 1947. 
 
Id. at 65-66 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 327 
(1974)). The Court concluded that "[n]o more specific 
reference to the Avco rule can be expected and the rest of 
the legislative history consistently sets out this clear 
intention to make S 502(a)(1)(B) suits . . . federal questions 
for the purposes of federal court jurisdiction in like manner 
as S 301 of the LMRA." Id. at 66. 
 
A similar analysis leads to the conclusion thatS 510 
standing alone does not have the "extraordinary" 
preemptive power that converts a state law claim into a 
federal one for jurisdictional purposes, and that therefore 
claims that seek impermissible relief for a pension-defeating 
termination and thus fall within S 510 but notS 502(a) are 
not removable. The scope of the jurisdictional subsection 
on which Metropolitan Life relied for itsfinding of complete 
preemption is expressly defined in terms of the relief 
sought, rather than the nature of the cause of action. See 
29 U.S.C. S 1132(f) ("The district courts .. . shall have 
jurisdiction . . . to grant the relief provided for in subsection 
(a) of this section in any action.). Moreover, the House 
Report cited by Metropolitan Life expressly invokes the 
doctrine of complete preemption twice: "[w]ith respect to 
suits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover 
benefits under the plan," H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, 
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1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 1974 WL 11542, at 166, and 
"suit[s] to recover benefits denied contrary to the terms of 
[the] plan," id. at 356-57. No such express reference to 
complete preemption appears in the discussion of the 
protection against pension-defeating discharge. See id. at 
357. Thus neither the statute nor the legislative history 
provide any evidence of Congressional intent to expand the 
scope of ERISA's complete preemptive power beyond those 
actions that fall within the civil enforcement provisions of 
S 502(a) to actions under S 510 that seek impermissible 
relief. 
 
This Court's precedent also supports the conclusion that 
claims seeking legal relief for violations of S 510 are only 
ordinarily preempted, and that federal jurisdiction is thus 
improper. This Court has recognized two prerequisites for a 
finding of complete preemption. "[C]omplete preemption 
applies only if `the statute relied upon by the defendant as 
preemptive contains civil enforcement provisions within the 
scope of which plaintiff's state claim falls," and there must 
also be a "clear indication of a Congressional intention to 
permit removal despite the plaintiff's exclusive reliance on 
state law." Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 
36 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 1994). Although ERISA provides 
a civil enforcement provision for violations ofS 510, if 
Wood's claims do not seek equitable relief, they do not fall 
"within the scope" of that provision. Furthermore, although 
there is clear evidence of Congressional intent to permit 
removal of actions within the scope of the civil enforcement 
provisions, which actions necessarily are potentially viable 
federal actions, there is no indication of Congressional 
intent to permit removal of actions that seek impermissible 
remedies and thus cannot be viable and must be 
dismissed. 
 
The Supreme Court's dicta in Ingersoll-Rand does not 
require a different result. Although Ingersoll-Rand was a 
case of ordinary preemption,1 after determining that 
S 502(a) provides the exclusive remedy for violations of 
S 510 the Court stated that " `when it is clear or may fairly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The case had been decided in Texas state courts, and thus federal 
jurisdiction was not at issue. See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 481. 
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be assumed that the activities which a State purports to 
regulate are protected' by S 510 of ERISA,`due regard for 
the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must 
yield.' " Id. (quoting Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, 
Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 n.8 (1988) (a case of ordinary, 
rather than complete preemption)). Although the majority 
reads this statement as suggesting that S 510 itself has 
complete preemptive effect, to be consistent with 
Metropolitan Life this statement must be read in context, 
which is that Ingersoll-Rand was a case of ordinary 
preemption in which federal jurisdiction was not at issue. 
This context suggests that it is not state court  jurisdiction 
that must yield when regulated activities fall within S 510, 
but rather the State's jurisdiction to regulate such 
activities, that is, mere ordinary preemption. Indeed, the 
dicta at issue immediately follows and supports the Court's 
holding that "the requirements of conflict pre-emption are 
satisfied in this case." Id. 
 
Contrary to the majority's assertion, Metropolitan Life 
does not stand for the proposition that state law claims 
may fall within S 502(a) and be completely preempted even 
if the plaintiff asks only for relief that is not available under 
S 502(a). While it is true that the plaintiff there claimed 
"compensation for mental anguish caused by breach of 
. . . contract" he also claimed "reimplementation of all 
benefits," the paradigm of S 502(a) relief. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 61. Accordingly, as the Court expressly 
pointed out, "General Motors and Metropolitan removed to 
federal court alleging federal question jurisdiction over the 
disability benefit claim by virtue of ERISA and pendant 
jurisdiction over the remaining claims." Id.  Thus, it was the 
claim for reinstatement of benefits that gave the Court 
jurisdiction to consider whether the state law claims 
seeking impermissible remedies were ordinarily preempted 
by ERISA. 
 
The fact that the plaintiff seeks remedies in his state 
cause of action that are unavailable under the federal cause 
of action clearly does not preclude a finding of ordinary 
preemption; indeed, ordinary preemption of inconsistent 
state remedies is the very purpose of the ERISA's limited 
civil actions provision and its broad ordinary preemption 
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provision. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux , 481 U.S. 41, 
51-54 (1987) ("The policy choices reflected in the inclusion 
of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the 
federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA- 
plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain 
remedies under state law that Congress rejected in 
ERISA."). Ordinary preemption, however, is for state courts 
to determine. 
 
II. 
 
Given that S 510 does not by itself have complete 
preemptive effect, it becomes necessary to determine 
whether Wood's claims fall within the civil enforcement 
provisions of S 502(a). Section 502(a) provides that: 
 
       A civil action may be brought-- 
 
       (1) by a participant or beneficiary-- 
 
         . . . 
 
         (B) to recover benefits due to him under the 
       terms of his plan, to enforce rights under the 
       terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to 
       future benefits under the terms of the plan; 
 
       . . . 
 
       (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to 
       enjoin any act or practice which violates any 
       provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, 
       or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) 
       to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any 
       provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the 
       plan . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. 1132(a). 
 
Section 510 of ERISA prohibits employers from 
discharging employees for the purpose of preventing a 
pension from vesting. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 
498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990). Section 510 provides that: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge . .. a 
       participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of 
       interfering with the attainment of any right to which 
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       such participant may become entitled under the plan 
       . . . . The provisions of section 1132 of this title[S 502 
       of ERISA] shall be applicable in the enforcement of this 
       section. 
 
29 U.S.C. 1140. Claims under S 510 are enforced under 
S 502(a)(3). See Zipf v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 
889, 891 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Ingersoll Rand , 498 U.S. 
at 143-44 (quoting only S 502(a)(3) and then stating that 
S 502(a) provides the remedy for violations ofS 510). Since 
this is not a suit to recover benefits or to enforce rights 
under a plan, the only potential avenue for finding Wood's 
state law claims are completely preempted is if they are 
claims under S 502(a)(3) to obtain "appropriate equitable 
relief to redress [a] violation[ ] of[S 510]." 29 U.S.C. 
1132(a)(3). 
 
In the instant case, it may well be that Wood's state 
causes of action include a claim that falls within the ambit 
of S 510, in that they assert that Wood's discharge was 
motivated by a desire to prevent his pension from vesting. 
I would conclude, however, that any such claim does not 
fall within S 502(a)(3), which reaches only claims for 
equitable relief. See 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3); Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-62 (1993) (holding that 
compensatory damages are unavailable under S 502(a)(3), 
which provides for equitable relief only); In re Unisys Corp. 
Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1268-69 
(3d Cir. 1995); Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 857 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (recognizing that Mertens' holding that damages 
are not available under S 502(a)(3) applies toS 510 claims). 
 
Wood seeks solely money damages. To the extent that his 
claim falls within the scope of S 510, the damages claimed 
are to compensate him for injuries inflicted by tortious 
behavior -- i.e., interference with a relationship that would 
ultimately have brought him pension benefits from a third 
party, the ERISA plan. Wood's claim cannot be 
characterized as an equitable one for restitution because 
the money sought is not being wrongfully held by the 
employer. Nor can the damages sought accurately be 
characterized as incidental to or intertwined with injunctive 
relief (and thus equitable in nature) because no equitable 
relief is sought. Finally, a monetary award here cannot be 
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viewed as an alternative to the equitable remedy of 
reinstatement (by analogy to a Title VII front pay award) 
both because Wood does not allege that reinstatement is 
unfeasible and, more importantly, because reinstatement 
would not result in his receiving pension benefits from the 
employer. What we have here, plain and simple, is a tort 
action seeking compensatory damages for interference with 
advantageous relations, and Wood is accordingly not 
seeking an equitable remedy. Case law from our court and 
the Supreme Court dictates, in my judgment, that we so 
hold. 
 
In Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), union 
members sought damages against the union for breach of 
the duty of fair representation. The union insisted that the 
plaintiffs were seeking an equitable remedy and that they 
were not entitled to a jury trial. The Court concluded to the 
contrary, observing: 
 
       [B]ecause we conclude that the remedy respondents 
       seek has none of the attributes that must be present 
       before we will find an exception to the general rule and 
       characterize damages as equitable, we find that the 
       remedy sought by respondents is legal. 
 
       First, we have characterized damages as equitable 
       where they are restitutionary, such as in "action[s] for 
       disgorgement of improper profits," Tull, 481 U.S., at 
       424. See also Curtis v. Loether, supra , at 197; Porter v. 
       Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946). The 
       backpay sought by respondents is not money 
       wrongfully held by the Union, but wages and benefits 
       they would have received from McLean [, the employer,] 
       had the Union processed the employees' grievances 
       properly. Such relief is not restitutionary. 
 
       Second, a monetary award "incidental to or 
       intertwined with injunctive relief may be equitable. Tull, 
       supra, at 424. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario 
       Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-292 (1960) (District 
       Court had power, incident to its injunctive powers, to 
       award backpay in that case was restitutionary). 
       Because respondents seek only money damages, this 
       characteristic is clearly absent from the case. 
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Teamsters, 494 U.S. at 570-71. 
 
The Terry Court distinguished on a number of grounds 
the Title VII cases that characterize backpay awards as a 
form of "equitable relief." First, the Court pointed out that 
Congress had specifically characterized backpay under Title 
VII as "equitable relief." Id. at 572. Second, and most 
important for present purposes, the Court noted that 
"backpay sought from an employer under Title VII would 
generally be restitutionary in nature . . ., in contrast to the 
damages sought here from the Union" to compensate for 
income the plaintiff would have received from the employer 
had there been no breach of the duty of fair representation. 
Id.; see also Woodell v. International Bd. of Elec. Workers, 
502 U.S. 93, 97-98 (1981) (holding in a suit by a union 
member against his union for discrimination in job referrals 
in the operation of its hiring hall that a "claim for lost 
wages cannot be treated as restitutionary . . . as the 
damages sought are for pay for jobs to which the union 
failed to refer him"). 
 
This Court followed a similar line of reasoning in Richel 
v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 664, n.16 (3d Cir. 1990), 
where we explained that a restitutionary award 
representing wages earned but not paid is to be 
distinguished from an award compensating for the inability 
to earn an income from another source due to tortious 
interference. 
 
There is one Third Circuit case that recognizes the 
availability of front pay in a Title VII case as"an alternative 
to the traditional remedy of reinstatement" prior to the 
statutory amendment that made damages available under 
Title VII. See Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 
885 (3d Cir. 1984). Goss does not help Wood, however. As 
Goss and the ADEA cases (the ADEA has always authorized 
legal and equitable remedies) recognize, a front pay remedy 
is available only where reinstatement is not an available 
remedy. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Sinclair Intern., 766 F.2d 788 
(3d Cir. 1985). Moreover, unlike front pay, recovery on the 
claim here asserted would not be a substitute for a 
reinstatement remedy since reinstatement would not call 
for the defendant to pay Woods' pension benefits. 
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Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the District Court 
had no jurisdiction over the claims made in the state 
complaint and should have remanded those claims to the 
state court, where Prudential may raise its preemption 
defense. 
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